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The European explorers who travelled through East Africa in increasing numbers during the second half of the 19th century encountered a number of unusual difficulties. Perhaps the most important of these was the lack of any widely recognised authority in the interior , and the level of endemic violence and lawlessness which made travel by small unarmed parties virtually impossible. Most East African chiefs were in the habit of demanding tolls, or hongo, in return for permission to pass through their land, and their cumulative demands frequently reached a level that even the best equipped expeditions could not afford to pay . In 1871, for example, H.M. Stanley was forced to take a long detour round Uhha when the inhabitants threatened to bankrupt him within a few days with their exactions. Opinions differed on the precise balance which was desirable between paying up and fighting — Carl Peters, for instance, never paid hongo, and was consequently obliged to fight almost every step of the way — but it was generally agreed that anyone who went into Africa without the means to fight would almost certainly be robbed of everything he possessed, and probably murdered into the bargain. Eugene Maizan, for example, was killed in Uzaramo in 1845, and Charles New was robbed of all his goods on Mount Kilimanjaro in 1861, forcing him to abandon his expedition. Speke and Grant nearly met a similar fate in Unyamwezi the same year , but were lucky to meet a friendly ruler in Karagwe, who sent them on to Buganda even without the tribute goods which they had lost. Another reason why small unescorted parties were not usually viable in Africa was the lack of any universally accepted currency . Supplies had to be bought and tolls paid with cloth, beads, and wire, and as the tribes had different preferences and might insist, for example, on beads of a particular colour , several hundred porters were required just to carry enough trade goods to cover most eventualities. This made the caravan not only unwieldy on the march but highly tempting to potential robbers. Travel in the African interior was also physically challenging because of the difficult terrain and the lack of roads. The need to rely on porters often placed severe restrictions on the size of expeditions and the equipment which they could carry , and several attempts were made to find alternative methods of transport. In 1871 Stanley invested in a small twowheeled cart which was supposed to be drawn by the porters, but the narrowness and unevenness of the trails made this impractical, and the cart was abandoned after Stanley saw one of his men carrying it on his head, having found this easier than pulling it. In 1877 the Church Missionary Society introduced South African ox-wagons, but the native oxen were not strong enough for the work, and those imported from Natal quickly died. The Indian elephants which the Belgians tried a few years later were equally unsuitable, and died of heat exhaustion on the open plains. For these reasons even peaceful civilian expeditions were obliged to organise and equip themselves like miniature armies, with the expectation of having to fight. In fact it is not always easy to distinguish between exploring expeditions and formal military operations: the former were often led by serving officers seconded by their governments, which equipped their personnel with weapons from military stocks. In addition to their porters most exploring expeditions also hired a number of ‘askaris’. These were not necessarily professional soldiers, but simply reliable men who served as a bodyguard and police force. The latter role was essential because Zanzibari porters in particular were in the habit of testing the character of their employer by strikes and other acts of insubordination, and were often only kept in line by the threat of flogging or even armed force.

Until after the departure of Cameron’ s expedition in 1873 the askaris were generally recruited from a list of reliable men recommended by the headman. For example, in 1871 Stanley’ s headman Sidi Bombay collected 18 volunteers ‘whom he knew would not desert, and for whom he declared himself responsible’. Stanley describes these as ‘an exceedingly fine-looking body of men’, but other explorers — notably Cameron — were less fortunate in their choices. Therefore it became the practice to keep a register at the British Consulate in Zanzibar of those men who had proved themselves and could be recommended. This was at least an attempt at forming a professional corps of askaris. The headmen themselves were usually recruited by a system of personal recommendation, and often made a career of serving on different expeditions. Sidi Bombay , for example, started as one of the Sultan of Zanzibar ’ s Baluchis, and went on to work with four famous explorers. This record was surpassed by his colleague Manwa Sera, who served under Speke, Livingstone, Stanley , Thomson, and T eleki over a period of nearly 30 years, and finally died on T eleki’ s expedition in 1888. It was customary to present the headmen with good quality hunting rifles, and from the 1870s onwards most expeditions would equip their askaris whenever possible with up-to-date breech-loaders, although the armed porters usually had to make do with flintlocks or percussion muzzle-loaders. Many explorers, however , expressed dissatisfaction with the military skills of their escorts. Speke says of the typical Zanzibari recruit: ‘If you give him a gun and some ammunition to protect him in case of emergencies, he will promise to save it, but forthwith expends it by firing it off in the air , and demands more, else he will fear to venture amongst the “savages”.’ Stanley , on the other hand, often writes admiringly of the courage and steadiness of his Zanzibaris, and tells how , when threatened by Bumbireh tribesmen in 1876, they ‘bore the first outburst of the tempest of shrieking rage with almost sublime imperturbability’. Unlike Speke’ s, however , Stanley’ s men were already veterans of several battles by that time. What could be expected of the average recruit is perhaps revealed by Cameron’ s comment about the target practice of his 35 askaris, who each fired three rounds at a packing case at a range of 100 yds (91 m): ‘although there were no hits the firing was fairly good’. The earliest expeditions tended to avoid fighting, if only because their ammunition was limited and they were dependent on local goodwill for supplies. Nevertheless, there was a clear trend as the century progressed from travellers like Burton and Speke, who co-operated with the Arabs and local chiefs as much as possible, and often travelled in company with Arab caravans along the recognised trade routes, to larger and better-equipped expeditions which were prepared to gain their objectives by force or the threat of it. In the early days, when expeditions were poorly financed, and European military technology was not sufficiently in advance of African methods of warfare to allow a handful of men to dominate much greater numbers, force was usually not an option. Harry Johnston mentioned another factor: at that time, before the Arab slavers stirred up widespread civil war and resentment of foreigners, the country was much more peaceful than in later decades. He pointed out that the missionary Rebmann had wandered safely across the foothills of Kilimanjaro in the 1840s with only ten porters, in an area where, 40 years later , Johnston himself and 20 armed soldiers had to fight for their lives. Jerome Becker , who commanded the Belgian fort at Karema in the early 1880s, expressed a different view . He believed that the early explorers — both Arab and European — had had less trouble with the inland tribes because in the 1850s and 1860s the latter were still unfamiliar with firearms, whereas by the 1880s they had either adopted guns themselves, or devised tactics for dealing with them. Furthermore, the novelty of the white men themselves had worn off. ‘The times are gone’, he says, ‘when the Arabs went from the coast to Ujiji carrying nothing but a stick, or when the mzungu was taken for a supernatural being and, by his mere presence in a caravan, inspired fear and respect. The black demons have discovered our vulnerable points.’ ORGANISA TION There was, of course, no standard system of organisation for exploring expeditions, but the following sample ‘orders of battle’ illustrate the kind of forces which might be deployed, depending on the resources available and the hostility of the inhabitants of the areas to be traversed. Speke and Grant, 1860–63 Captains Speke and Grant set out from Zanzibar in 1860 on one of the most ambitious expeditions ever attempted, aiming to cross the unexplored heart of the continent via Buganda to the sources of the Nile. They started with an escort of a corporal, a trumpeter , and eight privates, seconded from the Cape Mounted Rifles. These men were ‘Hottentots’ from South Africa, and were sent back early in the expedition as they were unable to stand the climate. A Jemadar and 25 Baluchi matchlockmen were also provided by the Sultan of Zanzibar as an escort for the first stage of the march. In addition, 50 muzzle-loading carbines were distributed to the most reliable of the 75 or so porters. These men were formed into companies of ten, each under a ‘Captain’, with ‘General’ Baraka — a Swahili freeman — as overall commander . Stanley’ s Livingstone Expedition, 1871–72 For his famous expedition in search of Doctor Livingstone, Stanley recruited 24 askaris, each with a flintlock musket and enough powder and ball for 200 rounds. Sidi Bombay , the headman, was provided with a muzzle-loading rifle and a pistol. Cameron, 1873–75 Lieutenant Cameron, as a serving officer in the Royal Navy , was also sent out from Zanzibar to find Livingstone, but discovered en route that the old explorer had died. Cameron went on to make the first crossing of Africa from east to west, eventually reaching the Portuguese settlements in Angola. He recruited 35 askaris in Zanzibar , and equipped them with Snider breech-loaders supplied by the British W ar Office. Some of the 192 porters also carried muskets, but more than half of them soon deserted because their inexperienced leader had made the mistake of paying them in advance. Stanley’ s T rans-Africa Expedition, 1874–77 This was one of the most lavishly funded expeditions ever to travel in Africa. Under Stanley’ s leadership it fought its way across the continent from Zanzibar to the mouth of the Congo, engaging in numerous battles with native tribes, as well as collaborating with the Baganda army of King Mtesa in some of its aggressive campaigns. This was what one critic in Britain called ‘a system of exploration by private war ’. Its order of march when it left Bagamoyo in November 1874 was as follows: an advance guard of four chiefs and 12 kirangozis armed with Sniders; then 270 porters, mostly armed with muzzleloaders and carrying a steel boat, the Lady Alice, in sections, as well as the usual trade goods; then the women and children, followed by the three white men and their gunbearers; and finally a rearguard of 16 chiefs with Sniders. There were in fact 70 Sniders issued altogether , but we are not told where in the column the remaining men who carried them were posted. The caravan numbered 356 people in total, and covered half a mile of road.

This expedition suffered enormous casualties from hunger , disease, and exhaustion, as well as from enemy action — mainly because of the excessively fast pace which Stanley insisted on, and his habitual carelessness about securing food supplies. Before it saw its first serious fighting, at V inyata in January 1875, 20 men had already died and 89 had deserted, on a march across fairly welltravelled country . Johnson and Thomson, 1879–80 On this expedition Keith Johnson and his second-in-command Joseph Thomson explored the region between Uhehe and the southern end of Lake T anganyika. Johnson died of fever early on, leaving Thomson in command. Their caravan was equipped with 30 Sniders, 20 muzzle-loading Enfield rifles bought at Zanzibar , and 22 ‘ancient’ muskets owned by the porters. Thomson believed in negotiating with the natives rather than fighting them, and appears to have had no confidence in the military abilities of his Zanzibari recruits. He refers to his strength as ‘seventy guns, a number which would have been formidable in any part of Africa, if the men had known how to use them, or had had sufficient courage to stand and aim when danger threatened.’ The Belgian expeditions, 1877–85 Between 1877 and 1883, five expeditions were despatched to East Africa by the ‘International African Association’, which was a cover for the colonial ambitions of King Leopold of Belgium. They were commanded by officers technically on leave from the Belgian army , manned by locally recruited askaris, and at least notionally organised along military lines. As such they might be considered as campaigns of conquest rather than genuine exploring expeditions, but their achievements in either field were insignificant. The first of the IAA caravans set out in 1877 for Karema on Lake T anganyika, where two years later it established a fortified base. This was supposed to have been one of a projected string of ‘hospitable and scientific’ stations across the continent, intended to provide support to explorers and missionaries. It was actually a substantial military fortification, although situated in a place of no strategic significance whatsoever . It was built on top of a low hill overlooking the lake and surrounded by a system of moats, ditches, and curtain walls. The fort flew the flag of the IAA, which later became that of the Congo Free State (a five-pointed gold star on a blue background). The second Belgian expedition, which left Zanzibar in 1879, attempted to introduce Indian elephants as beasts of burden, but three of the four animals involved died before they reached Karema, the two British employees in charge of them were killed by Ruga-Ruga, and the experiment was abandoned. All of these operations were dogged by what one participant called ‘bad luck’, but which seems more like chronic incompetence. Thomson, who visited Karema in 1880, says that the intention had been to build the fort at a location recommended by Stanley , but that the local guides had led the Belgians — whose officers knew nothing of African geography — to the wrong place. It was situated in the middle of a malarial swamp, with no food obtainable nearer than 20 miles away , and so far south of the caravan routes as to be useless as a way station for travellers. Thomson also remarks that the interior of the stockade was crowded with thatched huts, which were built so close together that it would have been easy to burn the lot in a few minutes. T o judge from one photograph, it appears that the watchtowers and portions of the wall itself were also thatched. Furthermore the Belgian commanders were on bad terms with the local chiefs, treating them without any justification as hostile, so the tribes had virtually blockaded the place. The Belgians had also antagonised the warlord Nyungu-yaMawe, whose territory lay across the supply route from the east. Several innocent visitors to Karema found themselves dragged along on punitive expeditions against the neighbouring tribes, on one of which the German explorer Bohm was seriously wounded by a musket ball. All supplies had to be brought in at great expense by Swahili caravans. Nevertheless, as Becker ’ s memoirs show , the officers of the garrison were extravagantly provided for , with delicacies brought from Europe, a library , and even musical instruments. Thomson later encountered the third IAA expedition on its way to Karema. It had been stranded at T abora due to a lack of porters, because its leader had refused to pay Arab middlemen to recruit them. The askaris were enlisted from among those who had already been rejected by other expeditions, and there was no money to provide them with uniforms or up-to-date weapons. In general, Thomson describes the IAA as ‘a laughing-stock’ to the natives, and its officers, who had been sent to Africa with hopelessly inadequate preparation, as ‘lost sheep’. He castigates their ‘marked absence of all care and common sense ... in the fitting out and organising of their caravans’, and accuses them of having turned many once friendly tribes against the whites. He adds that while he met frequent hostility in the area of the Association’ s operations, he managed to avert trouble by emphasising that he was not Belgian. Not surprisingly King Leopold failed to establish a permanent presence in East Africa, and after the Berlin Conference of 1885 he abandoned the region and concentrated his ambitions on the Congo. The fort at Karema was taken over by Catholic missionaries. T eleki, 1887–88 Count Samuel T eleki’ s expedition started out as a privately-funded hunting trip, but was effectively hijacked by the Austrian Crown Prince Rudolf, who persuaded him to take along an Austrian naval officer , Lieutenant Ludwig von Hohnel, and to turn the expedition into a quest for a large body of water (later named Lake Rudolf) rumoured to lie in the far north of Kenya. Uniquely for a self-financed traveller , T eleki struck out across entirely unknown country , well off the Arab trade routes, and in the face of opposition from the Kikuyu and other hostile tribes. For this reason his caravan was very heavily armed: the Count issued his porters and askaris with a total of 200 muzzle-loading muskets, 80 Austrian W erndl breech-loading carbines, and 12 Colt repeating rifles. T eleki was very reluctant to pay hongo and got into numerous skirmishes as a result, but he lost far more men from thirst and starvation than in combat. Gregory , 1891 Another private scientific expedition joined by J.W . Gregory in 1891 was to be even more heavily armed. It comprised eight Europeans, 250 riflemen equipped with Sniders, and a Maxim gun manned by a detachment of ten Turks. The objective of this caravan was also Lake Rudolf, but it was abandoned soon after starting out because of an outbreak of war with the Somalis to the north. Wellby , 1898 Captain Montague W ellby of the 18th Hussars was despatched by the British W ar Office in 1898 on a survey expedition to pioneer a route between British East Africa and the newly reconquered Sudan. This involved exploring the country between Lake Rudolf and the most south-easterly British garrison in the Sudan, on the Sobat River . W ellby was one of the last explorers to march into totally unknown territory , where, in his own words, ‘we were in total ignorance of what we were about to encounter each day , for the only information that the maps afforded us was a blank.’ The column was therefore equipped and organised like a small military expedition into hostile territory . Abyssinian, Sudanese, and Somali soldiers were recruited in Abyssinia and issued with 35 Martini Henry rifles. Scouts and advance guards were routinely deployed on the march to screen the column from observation and secure water supplies. In fact — apart from some skirmishes with the Turkana around Lake Rudolf — the tribesmen kept their distance from the caravan, and no serious fighting occurred. Charles Stokes By the 1880s there were a few white men operating more or less permanently in the interior of East Africa. Most of these were missionaries, but one man who was closely involved with political and military developments was the Irishman Charles Stokes. Starting as a lay missionary , in 1885 he married a member of Mirambo’ s family and went into business as a trader , leading caravans manned by his new Nyamwezi relatives between Zanzibar and Buganda. When the Abushiri W ar broke out in 1888 the British and German authorities on the coast imposed an embargo on the import of firearms and the price of guns and powder in the interior soared. Stokes therefore went into the gun-running business, buying up British Army surplus percussion muskets and even some breechloaders from the African Lakes Company , based in what was soon to become British Central Africa (now Malawi). He transported these guns to Buganda and sold them to King Mwanga. This was in contravention of an international treaty forbidding the sale of modern weapons to African states, but although the British and the missionaries protested, the Germans — through whose territory the caravans passed — did not interfere. In fact Stokes was by now too useful to both the colonial powers to be disciplined. He carried the supplies which enabled Stanley’ s Emin Pasha expedition to reach the coast in 1889, he operated the only postal service between Mombasa and the missionaries in Buganda, and the British Consul in Zanzibar courted him as a potential source of intelligence on German activities, although he never actually provided any . His financial backer was a Hindu merchant who also bankrolled the Arab slaver Tippu Tib. Stokes made vast profits supplying guns to Buganda in exchange for ivory , and in 1889 he even launched his own steamship on Lake V ictoria. By this time Stokes was a political power in his own right. The caravans which he operated were often more powerful military forces than the local armies mustered by the colonial powers; one which assembled at Saadani in May 1890 comprised 2,500 Nyamwezi tribesmen, all armed with guns. He supported the Christian faction in Buganda’ s civil war , using his steamer to provide them with weapons and other supplies, and helped to negotiate the settlement that restored Mwanga to his throne. In 1890 he was put in charge of the supplies for Emin Pasha’ s latest German expedition, with the temporary rank of Assistant Reichskommissar. At the same time he was secretly working for the British — with the task of making treaties with the tribes on their side of the border with German East Africa — and for Mwanga, for whom he was illegally buying guns on the coast. Although he claimed to be a loyal British subject Stokes came to the brink of open hostilities with Lugard in 1891, when the latter commandeered a large consignment of guns intended for Mwanga and distributed them to the Baganda Protestants. The trader went so far as to threaten to march through Buganda under the Union Jack without Lugard’ s permission, and to die fighting at the head of his men if the British forces fired on him. This bizarre scenario was never realised, but in the following year he embarked on another adventure, described by his biographer as ‘an expedition equipped by Germany for warfare in Belgian territory’. This force entered Congo Free State territory (ostensibly in search of ivory) with ten Sniders and 600 muzzle-loaders, as well as an escort of 30 askaris in German uniforms, provided by Captain Langheld from the German station at Bukoba. Apparently the Germans planned to use Stokes’ trading activities as a cover for the occupation of Rwanda and the Semliki V alley — a region where the borders of the British, Belgian, and German spheres had not yet been properly surveyed — before the Belgians could make their own claim to the area effective. A second expedition followed in 1893, but there were no armed clashes with Free State forces because the latter were still busy with their war against the Congo Arabs. In May 1894 Stokes again attempted to interfere in the affairs of the colonial powers when he wrote to the British commander in Buganda, Colonel Colville, offering to recapture W adelai in the Equatoria Province of Sudan, which had recently been occupied by the Mahdists. Colville was concerned that Stokes might upset the delicate negotiations which were going on with the Germans and Belgians about control of the area, and furthermore was unsure about whether the trader proposed to act on behalf of Britain or Germany . He therefore warned him off in a letter stating that ‘I can only treat any unauthorised warlike operations as acts of piracy’. In fact it is unlikely that Stokes ever seriously intended to commit his forces to open warfare. Langheld later stated that ‘Stokes was not fond of placing himself in personal danger , and was most unlikely to be involved in any enterprise involving personal risk. His one aim was to make money .’

Stokes’ career came to an end in January 1895. He returned to the Congo Free State, where he had left a party under his employee Juma bin Ali in charge of a huge cache of guns and ivory , but found that the local Arabs and Manyema tribesmen had wiped out the party and stolen his goods. His other Arab trading partners had by now either defected to the Belgians or been defeated by them. Instead of escaping into British territory he attempted to negotiate with the Belgian commander in the area, Captain Lothaire, and marched to meet him with an escort of ten German askaris, flying the British and German flags. Lothaire arrested and summarily hanged him for supplying guns to the Arabs and being part of a German plot to invade the Free State. The Belgians then located Stokes’ base in the forest and massacred his men, many of whom were sick. The killing of a white man — ‘for all the world as if he were a native’ as one British official revealingly commented — sparked an international incident, but did not prevent the British and Belgian officers on the spot finalising the demarcation of the frontier amicably later the same year .

Тактика

In view of the variety of possible threats, and the lack of military training of many of their personnel, it is not surprising that there was no formal tactical doctrine among exploring expeditions. Nevertheless, a number of explorers did have considerable military experience, and often improvised tactics very successfully under unfamiliar conditions. Many , such as Speke and Grant (who were both distinguished veterans of the wars in India), were serving army or navy officers. Stanley , although employed as a journalist, had covered several conflicts as a war correspondent and had fought in the American Civil W ar . Carl Peters, although not from a military background, showed exceptional skill in fighting his way through more than 1,000 miles (1,600 km) of hostile territory — although admittedly this was mostly territory which was only hostile because of his own provocative behaviour . On the other hand, the adventures of some explorers occasionally read more like farce than military history . In 1849, Krapf had to be rescued from Kikuyu bandits by friendly Kambas after the disastrous failure of his own attempts at defence: ‘In the confusion I lost my powder horn, and one of my people burst the barrel of his gun by putting too large a charge into it. The ramrod of another was broken through his being knocked over [by one of Krapf ’ s own men] ... just as he was going to load, whilst the gun of another missed fire altogether .’ On another occasion Krapf was forced to beat a hasty retreat from a fight after accidentally firing away his own ramrod. Other travellers might have to seek counsel from those with relevant experience. Mary French-Sheldon quotes the following advice given to her by Captain Stairs, a veteran of Stanley’ s Emin Pasha Expedition, in 1891: ‘Hints For Camps, Etc., As Regards Defence. ‘I. Choose commanding position, one not near long grass or bush, if hostile natives are about. ‘II. Beware of long, dry grass near camp; natives may set fire to it and burn you out. So clear a space round your goods of twenty to thirty yards diameter . ‘III. Cover up your goods with tarpaulins, and place sentries, and as a general order let this be the rallying point in the night or when danger appears imminent. ‘IV . Place sentries (black) in groups of not less than three men each at exit and ingress of camp, seventy yards from centre, and in great danger , groups to right and left. ‘V . In an attack on camp at night the first notice will be some arrows falling in the camp. At once order silence, smother down the fires, as the natives invariably fire at these in hopes of hitting men lying about them, and rally near the centre pile of goods, and store of ammunition; then send out some of your most reliable men, but you yourself keep in camp and direct matters. ‘VI. Never move a step in Africa without two or three attendants with rifles. Make this a maxim, for one day it may save your life; and remember there are maniacs in Africa as well as elsewhere. ‘VII. Y our column organise as follows: first, your riflemen, without loads*; then the carriers, then a small force under a chief in rear , and for this pick your very best man. [*Mrs French Sheldon remarks that this was impossible in her case, as all her riflemen doubled as porters. Captain Stairs, of course, was accustomed to more lavishly equipped military-style expeditions.] ‘VIII. Insist on your personal baggage, tents, and blankets being near your person, and always up in front, otherwise you may arrive in camp and your things be hours behind. ‘IX. Number every bale, box, load, or bundle, and enter in a book against the name of its carrier , and endeavour to give the same loads to the same men each day . ‘X. Fall the men in each morning, call the roll, and give out their loads in person. This keeps up the discipline and prevents favouritism, as the best black chief will give his friends light loads if left to himself. ‘XI. Always try to keep near you quinine, carbonate of ammonia, and one or two other standard medicines. ‘XII. Natives as a rule prefer day to night for attack; a night march may often put you out of a difficulty . ‘XIII. Go slowly at first, with frequent halts till the men and women get strong; allow as many women as possible to accompany you, as it shows peaceful intentions. ‘XIV . Do all the palavering yourself if possible. Swahili will carry you far along your journey . ‘XV . Y ou as a woman possess many points that no man would have in dealing with Africans. Y ou therefore should find an entree easy anywhere. ‘Never put your tent on the edge of the camp, and always have trusty ones sleeping near you. ‘When no immediate danger is apprehended, the sentries should be outside the camp, fifty yards, which is about bow-shot. ‘In conclusion, I feel sure that your invaluable tact and perception will pull you through much that a man would fail at. ‘In danger or in safety , do not forget to have always in camp some watchers, or sentries, with their rifles handy . ‘Y ou can never be safe till this is done, and the men know what to do in an emergency .’ As late as 1894, in a chapter on British East Africa which he contributed to a book on big-game hunting, Frederick Jackson continued to recommend that travellers organise their caravans as if for a military campaign. If travelling no further than Mount Kilimanjaro or the south bank of the T ana River , he says, 25 askaris with breech-loading rifles would be a sufficient force, but for a trip onto the Masai plains between 50 and 80 would be better . North of Lake Baringo, he suggests taking ‘at least 80 to 100’ men, as the Suk and other local tribes were not only hostile but relatively unafraid of firearms. Beyond the T ana, where Somali bands might be encountered, he regards it as too dangerous to venture without a force of 150 rifles. This advice probably erred on the side of caution — only a year or so later Major Owen was ‘firmly of the belief that a disciplined caravan with thirty rifles is now quite safe in the once dreaded Masailand’ — but it illustrates the extent to which travel was still thought of in military terms, even in country nominally under British control. The building of a fortified camp at night was generally regarded as an essential precaution against attack. Often thorn bushes were simply uprooted and dragged together to form an improvised obstacle, although when time permitted more substantial wooden stockades and earthworks might be constructed. Stanley , who was never short of manpower , even made a practice of building wooden watchtowers around the perimeters of his camps. Peters eventually abandoned the fencing of his camps, relying instead on a ring of sentries with bonfires at every post, but his Somalis were exceptionally reliable soldiers, and few leaders would have wanted to rely on the steadiness of Zanzibari askaris if attacked at night without defences. Surprisingly few exploring expeditions ever stood up to a full-scale daylight attack by determined opponents in open country . Stanley and Peters were among the minority who attempted this, and both agreed that it was advisable to take the offensive if possible, rather than surrendering the initiative to a more mobile enemy . After one skirmish in Kavirondo Peters criticised the commander of his Somalis, Hussein, for being too cautious. Instead of advancing slowly while firing, which wasted ammunition and enabled the enemy to get away with their cattle, he believed that the best tactic was to fire one or two volleys and then charge. Peters considered that the most important strategic consideration, in fact ‘the chief task of the leader ’, was the organisation of supplies for the expedition. He condemns Stanley for neglecting this, and remarks in connection with the latter ’ s Emin Pasha Expedition that its leader ‘even seems to be of the opinion that he will awaken the sympathies of Europe, by giving a picture of the sufferings that resulted from such carelessness’. The German explorer ’ s solution to his own difficulties was to steal large numbers of cattle, sheep, and goats from the tribes along his route and drive them along with him to provide meat.

Rockets and psychological warfare

Psychological warfare was always considered vital when dealing with unsophisticated tribes, and several explorers carried a supply of rockets in the hope of overawing attackers without having to resort to their guns. Baker used 3-pdr Hales rockets as offensive weapons in Bunyoro in 1872. He reported that they could be ‘slipped under the strap of a soldier ’ s knapsack and carried with ease during a march’, but that they would have been far more useful if they had carried explosive warheads. He tried to use them to set fire to the thatched huts of the Bari, but they failed to do so because ‘the rapidity of their flight did not afford sufficient time for ignition’. Instead he used what he calls ‘capped blue lights’, incendiary devices which could be struck on the butt of a gun, and ‘will set fire to a grass hut in an instant’.

Harry Johnston employed fireworks as a purely psychological weapon on Mount Kilimanjaro in 1884, frightening off an army of Chaga warriors with ‘a grand display of fireworks ... Bengal lights, red fire, Roman candles, serpent squibs, and lastly a magnificent flight of rockets’, all of which had been brought along specifically for this purpose. They were not always effective, however; Peters found that the Masai were not intimidated by his red and green flares, although they did provide useful illumination for shooting at night. Perhaps the most bizarre stratagem ever adopted in Africa is described by Joseph Thomson, who discovered the remains of an expedition led by a French explorer , the Abbé Debaize, at Karema in 1880. Debaize had brought with him ‘twelve boxes of rockets and fireworks, which would require about forty-eight men to carry them, several boxes of dynamite (for what conceivable use no one knows), two large barrels of gunpowder , innumerable revolvers and guns, two coats of armour ... also a hurdy-gurdy , valued at 12,000 francs.’ The rockets and the barrel organ were intended to frighten off hostile tribesmen, and the armour (whose method of construction is not stated) was supposed to protect Debaize from arrows while he let off the fireworks. This scheme, says Thomson, ‘has never yet had a proper trial’, as Debaize ‘went mad’ and died at Ujiji. Thomson himself resorted to crude conjuring tricks and the novelty of a white man’ s appearance to impress the Masai, removing and replacing his artificial front teeth, and asking the warriors ‘Could anyone but a great medicine-man have a skin like mine, or hair like mine?’ As his caravan was far too weak to have resisted an attack, he believed that his showmanship had probably saved his life. William Chanler , a rich young American who travelled to the Rendille country in 1892, was inspired by this example to take along his own conjuror , as well as a dozen pairs of flesh-coloured gloves, which according to an interview in Harper ’ s Magazine he intended ‘to pull carelessly off his hands while conversing with African kings, and so impress them with the idea that he is skinning himself alive’.